国际先驱论坛报 北京、香港和澳门

中国的“共产主义资本主义”可能处于转折点上。党员会不会继续为私利牺牲大众利益？或者，最近的反腐驱动背后是否由足够的动力制止溜向伪资本主义国家的滑坡？

　　可以从北京如何看待它与香港及澳门的联系找到线索。最近，中央显然试图控制最公然的制度践踏。在澳门，一位被控收受2800万美元贿赂的前运输工务司司长面临76项控罪。如果不是北京施压清理澳门，这些很可能不会遭到起诉。

　　同时，在边境那边的广东，一名前警察局长被控窃取130万美元到澳门赌博，在另一起案件中，一名女子被控非法吸储2亿美元以偿还赌债。

　　北京还宣布了一项举动，通过关闭一个灰市货币交换中心和打击货币出口，令从大陆流向香港澳门的货币流减半。

　　清理的工作还延伸到股市，迄今为止，以上市前低价取得股份是处于有利职位的官员一夜变成千万富翁的最简单办法。根据世界银行报告，以人为低价出售国有资产股份仅一年就令中国损失95亿美元，比北京投入农村教育的钱还多。

　　所有这些表明政府认真关注党和国家官员猖獗的敛财行为对社会稳定的影响。打击可能吓着一些人。利率提高，货币紧缩，过分膨胀的股市预期下跌，这些可能有限地减轻这个问题。

　　然而，但只要高层涉嫌贪污，根本性的清理是难以捉摸的。没有地方官员的合作，不会有大的改变。法规缺乏执行。例如，早就有禁令禁止官员到澳门去，但这个禁令很大程度上被忽视了。

　　只要中国仍然充斥着现金和过剩的外汇收入，阻止资本流的工作将仍然是与风车作战的行为，而且正和当下一样，许多玩家仍然是国有企业。

　　清理工作不大可能深入的原因之一是北京政府注重表象多于注重实际。真正的反腐将鼓励告发和报道滥权。

　　但高层领导人很明白，那些没有得到优待的群体的期望受挫，会助长日深的怨恨。同时，脚跨政府和企业的做法会令党腐败。但它的领导人明白如果他们不继续留在企业，他们的权力将迅速遭削弱。尽管如此，人们怀疑他们有没有意愿或办法改变这种情况。这是中国目前版本的共产主义的基本矛盾。（作者 Philip Bowring）

Bowring: Beijing, Hong Kong & Macau

HONG KONG: China's "communist capitalism" may be at a tipping point. Will the private interests of party members continue to gain at public expense?

Or is there enough momentum behind the latest drive against corruption to halt the slide towards a faux-capitalist state?

For clues watch how Beijing views links with Hong Kong and Macau, its two semi-autonomous "special administrative regions."

There has recently been evidence that the center is trying to get a grip on the most flagrant abuses of the system. In Macau, a former public works minister accused of $28 million in bribes is facing 76 charges of corruption and money laundering. The charges probably would not have been filed but for pressure from Beijing to clean up Macau.

The trial has shown up the alleged involvement of various mainland state enterprises in large-scale corruption, touched foreign-owned casino ventures and stalled the City of Dreams project of the American entertainment giant Melco and Australia's PBL group.

Meanwhile, across the border in Guangdong, a former police chief has been held on charges of stealing $1.3 million to gamble in Macau, and in another case a woman has been charged with defrauding accounts of $200 million to pay gambling debts.

Beijing also has announced a move to halve the flow of money from the mainland to Hong Kong and Macao by closing a gray-market currency swap center and cracking down on export of currency notes.

The clean-up effort also has extended to stock market listings, hitherto the easiest way for well-placed officials to become overnight multi-millionaires by being allotted shares at low pre-listing prices.

According to a World Bank report, the sale of shares in state assets at artificially low prices in just one year has cost China $9.5 billion, more than Beijing spends on rural education.

The recent issue of Petrochina shares in Shanghai, for example, could have put $3 billion into the hands of insiders with pre-public allotments. But the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission now has warned that it will enforce tighter rules.

All this suggests that the government is seriously concerned over the impact on social stability of rampant money-grabbing by party and state officials. The crackdown may scare some. Interest rate increases, tighter money and the expected decline of the over-inflated stock market may reduce the problem by limiting opportunities.

However, a fundamental clean-up will be elusive as long as some among officials in the top leadership are suspected of corruption. Without cooperation from local officials nothing much will change. Enforcement of rules is lacking.

There has long been, for example, a ban on officials visiting Macau, but it has been largely ignored, even though the state has enough sway over Macau's casinos to discover the identities of the high-rollers.

As long as China stays awash with cash and excess foreign exchange earnings, the effort to halt capital flows will remain a case of tilting at windmills, and many of the players will remain, as now, state-owned enterprises.

One reason the clean-up is unlikely to go very deep is that the government in Beijing is more concerned with appearances than reality. It has been clamping down on the media to stop reports of unsavory developments - whether they involve official corruption, polluting factories or sleazy land deals. Only a real assault on corruption would encourage whistle-blowing and reporting of abuses.

Even if top party officials are not themselves getting rich, they have plenty of relatives who are. These so-called princelings are everywhere - as members of the board of state enterprises, serving as financial sector intermediaries, or using their influence in urban land deals. They have a sense of entitlement to wealth.

Even Prime Minister Wen Jiaobao, normally portrayed as sensitive to social disparities, has been touched - mainland Internet chat-rooms have reportedly been discussing the shopping habits of his wife.

Little is known for sure about the wealth of party leaders and their families. In China, the subject is taboo.

But the top leadership is well aware of the rising resentment fueled by the thwarted expectations of less-favored groups. Being simultaneously in government and business corrupts the party. But its leaders know that if they do not remain in business their power will rapidly erode. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that they have either the will or the means to change things. That is the fundamental contradiction of China's current version of Communism.