福布斯杂志 中国：最先碎掉的金砖？

中国股市泡沫可能破裂，这很可能打击消费者的信心和消费以及商业投资。而且跌得可能很惨，因为自从去年价格乘三倍后，上海股票现在的市盈率大约是55倍。

　　在上个熊市之末2005年，中国家庭有8.6%的金融资产在股市，如今则大约是22%。一些最热的股票包括携程网、百度、中国移动和中海油。因此这次的负面效果可能会大得多。

　　许多公司投资其他公司的股票，就像日本公司过去干的那样（当九十年代股市崩溃，公司就受拖累）。研究表明，中国上市公司今年上半年三分之一的利润来自股价的收获和其他投资收入。因此如果中国股市塌了，公司利润和投资可能受到严重伤害。银行也可能受伤，因为投资者贷款购买股票（伪装成抵押以避开禁令），如果股价垮掉这些贷款也就变成了坏帐。估计大约20%的银行贷款已经不良。这比早期的50%高峰要低，但远远高于官方数字的7%。

　　精明的投资者巴菲特最近卸掉了中石油股票（他在2003年4月购入，利润超过600%），这表明至少有一个精明的长期投资者认为中国股市泡沫接近破裂。中国多泡沫的IPO市场传达了同样的信息，让人想起九十年代末的美国科技股运气。最近，中国证监会主席表示关切投资者风险意识的缺乏。

　　有人认为，任何来源的经济放缓都可以与财政刺激措施抵消，因为政府的财政赤字接近平衡。但政府的支出已经接近国内生产总值（GDP）的20%，在一个财政保守的国家，这是大份额了。而且和大多数政府一样，人们质疑北京会否及时采取行动防止严重的经济混乱。

　　我们的全球脱钩研究集中在中国，顾及印度。但认为“金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国）”中另外两个出口主导型国家将在美国消费衰退的情况下继续强劲增长的想法也是有疑问的。美国衰退毫无疑问会导致能源价格崩溃，对能源出口主导型的俄罗斯极端不利。而且即使这些金砖国家继续快速增长，它们在经济上太小，不足以推动全球经济的球。在2006年年末，它们的总GDP为5.6万亿美元，仅仅是美国的45%，欧元区13国的56%。此外，在第二季度，世界第二大经济体日本的实际GDP下降了1.2%，而且在欧洲，商业信心在下降。

　　因此我们认为重要的发展中国家，特别是中国，其迅速增长仍然由向美国消费者的直接或间接出口推动。当地中产阶级没有足够大，或者至少在十年内不大可能产生国内拉动的增长，更别说通过从美国大量进口推动美国的扩张了。

　　而且随着美国房市的崩溃，美国消费者可能结束他们25年来的借贷消费放纵，开始节俭，对美出口以及亚洲当地消费增长将严重受限。

　　这绝不会令中国的阳光未来变得悲观，特别是如果私营企业继续蓬勃发展的话。在2006年，私营企业给中国的GDP贡献了40%。如果不必要保留众多效率低下的、亏损的公共企业以避免大规模下岗和加重失业问题，那私营企业无疑将是GDP的最大贡献者。

　　从长期来看，中国拥有光明的未来，但在此期间，她的光芒可能会黯淡下来，就像日本八十年代的光辉在九十年代变成黑洞。我们最近的深度研究强化了这一长期的观点。（作者 A. Gary Shilling）


China: First BRIC To Crumble?

A. Gary Shilling, Insight

The likely bursting of the Chinese stock market bubble will probably depress consumer confidence and spending as well as business investment. And the fall could be great since Shanghai shares now sell at about 55 times earnings after tripling in price in the last year, compared with 18 times for the S&P 500.

Chinese households have around 22% of their financial assets in stocks compared with 8.6% in 2005 at the end of the last bear market. Some of the hottest stocks in China and here include CTrip (nasdaq: CTRP - news - people ), Baidu (nasdaq: BIDU - news - people ), China Mobile (nyse: CHL - news - people ) and CNOOC (nyse: CEO - news - people ). So the negative effects could be much greater this time.

Many companies invest in other firms' stocks, just as Japanese corporations used to do and suffered when stocks there collapsed in the 1990s. Studies show that one-third of listed Chinese company profits in the first half of 2007 came from stock price gains and other investment income. So if Chinese stocks tank, corporate profits and investments could be damaged severely. Banks could also be hurt as investor loans to buy stocks, disguised as mortgages to avoid the prohibition on these loans, go bad with a stock price collapse. And estimates are that around 20% of bank loans are already nonperforming. That's down from the earlier 50% peak, but far higher than the 7% official number.

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Savvy investor Warren Buffett recently unloaded the PetroChina (nyse: PTR - news - people ) stock he bought in April 2003 after a gain of over 600%, suggesting that at least one savvy long-term investor believes the Chinese stock bubble is close to bursting. The frothy IPO market in China delivers the same message and is reminiscent of the late 1990s U.S. dot-com bonanza. Recently, the Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission said, “I want to express my concern over the lack of risk awareness among investors.”

This year, first day returns on Chinese IPOs have averaged 192%. Extremes tend to be greater in retail-dominated markets like China's at present where foreign institutions are permitted little participation. The 121% leap in the Shanghai Composite Index so far this year has only spurred investment bankers to issue and retail investors to buy IPOs.

Government Rescue?

Some argue that economic slowdown from any source can be offset with fiscal stimuli since the government budget deficit is close to balance. But government outlays already are approaching 20% of gross domestic product, big in a fiscally conservative country. And it's questionable whether, like most governments, Beijing would act in time to prevent serious economic disruptions.

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BRICs

Our examination of the global decoupling argument has concentrated on China with some attention to India. But the hope that the other two export-led BRICs (Brazil and Russia, India and China) will continue robust growth as the U.S. consumer retrenches is also questionable. A U.S. recession will no doubt collapse energy prices to the extreme detriment of energy export-led Russia. And even if the BRIC nations continued to grow rapidly, they are just too small economically to carry the global economic ball. Their collective GDP was $5.6 trillion at the end of 2006, only 45% of America's and 56% of that of the 13-country eurozone. Furthermore, Japan, the world's second largest economy, is slipping with a 1.2% decline in real GDP in the second quarter, and in the E.U., business confidence is falling.

So we conclude that the rapid growth of major developing lands, especially China, is still driven by direct and indirect exports to U.S. consumers. Local middle classes aren't big enough yet or likely to be for at least a decade to generate domestically led growth, much less promote U.S. expansion through massive imports from America. All the PCs owned by citizens of those countries and the 450 million cellphone users in China and 150 million in India are the result of exports earnings and direct foreign investment.

And with U.S. consumers likely to end their 25 years of borrowing and spending and mount a saving spree as American housing collapses, exports to the U.S., and hence growth in local spending in Asia, will be severely restricted.

This in no way dims the sunny future of China, especially if the private sector continues to flourish. Since 1978, when China started to nurture her private sector, it has been the engine of economic growth. In that year, it was officially shifted from “the tail of capitalism” to “a complement to the private sector economy.” In 1998, the private sector was enhanced further by officially moving from a “complement” to “an important component” of China's socialist market economy.

Then in 2002, the non-public sector was in effect institutionalized as a principal sector of the economy and treated equally with the public sector. A report to the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that year said that “all legitimate income from work or not should be protected” and “we should improve the legal system for protecting private property.” We were in Beijing during the 17th National Congress and entrepreneurs, who are now party members and delegates, were lauded. The policy-setting Central Committee of 204 members and 167 alternates included 20 entrepreneurs, one of them from the private sector. The rest were senior officials of the party, government and military, but none were peasants or workers.

In 2006, the private sector contributed 40% to China's GDP, up from 0.9% in 1978, with 25% compound annual growth in the meantime. And the private sector would no doubt be a greater share of GDP if it weren't necessary to keep many inefficient, money-losing public businesses in business in order to avoid big layoffs and further unemployment problems. Some 160 government-owned enterprises control $1.6 trillion in assets, and the public sector produces 60% of GDP.

Long term, China has a bright future, but in the meanwhile her glitter may be tarnished much as was the radiance of Japan in the 1980s that became a black hole in the 1990s. Our recent in-depth research reinforces this long-held belief, as does the information gathered on our just-concluded trip to China. But one aspect of Chinese life was truly surprising. In all the meals we ate during our two weeks there, we never were served any fortune cookies.